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Dynamic adjustmentWe investigate monetary policy eﬀects on corporate investment adjustment,
using a sample of China’s A-share listed ﬁrms (2005–2012), under an asym-
metic framework and from a monetary policy transmission channel perspec-
tive. We ﬁnd that corporate investment adjustment is faster in expansionary
than contractionary monetary policy periods. Monetary policy has a signiﬁ-
cant eﬀect on adjustment speed through monetary and credit channels. An
increase in the growth rate of money supply or credit accelerates adjustment.
Both eﬀects are signiﬁcantly greater during tightening than expansionary per-
iods. The monetary channel has signiﬁcant asymmetry, whereas the credit
channel has none. Leverage moderates the relationship between monetary pol-
icy and adjustment, with a greater eﬀect in expansionary periods. This study
enriches the corporate investment behavior literature and can help govern-
ments develop and optimize macro-control policies.
 2015 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This
is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creative-
commons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Investment decisions are one of the three main ﬁnancial decisions made by corporations. Modigliani and
Miller (1958) propose that corporate investment decisions are independent of ﬁnancing decisions under a ser-
ies of strict assumptions. Subsequently, researchers have relaxed the strict hypothesis of the Modigliani–Miller
theorem and developed the theory of investment cash ﬂow sensitivities, based on the perspective of ﬁnancing
constraints caused by asymmetric information, and the theory of free cash ﬂow over-investment, based on the
perspective of agency conﬂicts. These theories argue that the appearance of imperfect markets and agency
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porate investment.
The macroeconomic policy environment aﬀects corporate investment decisions. Management science
research has recently focused on overcoming the micro–macro divide in the ﬁeld, expanding research methods
and theoretical innovation and bridging the science-practice gap (Aguinis et al., 2011). Studies on the decision-
making behavior of micro-enterprises that consider macro policies are increasingly common (Fan et al., 2014;
Jiang and Rao, 2011; Rao et al., 2013). Studies based on the monetary policy perspective mainly focus on the
inﬂuence of monetary policy on capital structure dynamic adjustment (Cook and Tang, 2010; Luo and Nie,
2012; Ma and Hu, 2012; Su and Zeng, 2009), the policy of cash holdings (Baum et al., 2006, 2008; Zhu and Lu,
2009) and credit ﬁnancing (Li and Wang, 2011; Rao and Jiang, 2013a,b). Few studies focus on investment
decisions.
Monetary policy is an important macro external variable that aﬀects the investment decisions of enter-
prises. There is a body of literature focusing on the eﬀect of monetary policy on corporate investment. Jing
et al. (2012) ﬁnd that loose monetary policy reduces the ﬁnancing constraints of private enterprises.
However, the ﬁnancing redundancy resulting from loose monetary policy leads to ineﬃcient investments by
private enterprises with poor or general investment opportunities. In contrast, a good ﬁnancing environment
enables a company to take advantage of more investment opportunities, enhancing the eﬃciency of capital
allocation when the company faces better investment opportunities. Xuan (2012) ﬁnds that a company can
improve its ability to obtain loans and its investment level during tight monetary policies if it follows an
ongoing conservative debt ﬁnancial policy during expansionary monetary policies. Companies that follow a
conservative debt ﬁnancial policy are able to respond to monetary policy shocks and weaken their eﬀects.
Liu et al. (2013) ﬁnd that internal capital markets in business groups buﬀer the eﬀect of monetary policy
on corporate investment.
The studies on monetary policy and corporate investment behavior mainly focus on under- and over-
investment caused by credit ﬁnancing constraints. Few studies explore the inﬂuence of monetary policies
and transmission channels on the direction and speed of investment dynamic adjustment, especially from an
asymmetric perspective. By clarifying these issues, we can reveal monetary policy transmission mechanisms
at the micro level and examine their eﬀects. Therefore, this paper uses Richardson’s (2006) estimation model
of expected investment and Flannery and Rangan’s (2006) partial adjustment model to study the inﬂuence
of monetary policy states and transmission channels on the direction and speed of investment dynamic
adjustment.
Our results indicate that corporate investment adjustment is faster during expansionary monetary policy
periods than contraction periods. The eﬀect of the money supply on the corporate investment adjustment
speed is signiﬁcantly greater in tight monetary policy periods than in loose periods. This eﬀect is signiﬁcantly
asymmetric. An increase in the growth rate of the credit scale accelerates corporate investment adjustment.
This channel does not have a signiﬁcant asymmetric eﬀect. Leverage has a greater eﬀect on corporate invest-
ment in expansionary monetary policy periods.
The contribution of this paper is as follows. First, the estimation model of the dynamic adjustment of cor-
porate investment is designed by integrating the investment eﬃciency and partial adjustment models. This
model provides the basis for studying the eﬀect of monetary policy on the dynamic adjustment of corporate
investment. Second, we study the eﬀect of monetary policy transmission channels on corporate investment
behavior through detailed microscopic transmission channels of monetary policy. Third, we examine whether
monetary policy and its transmission channels have an asymmetric eﬀect on the adjustment of corporate
investment. Finally, the literature mainly focuses on the inﬂuence of ﬁnancing constraints on investment,
due to the credit channel of monetary policy. We simultaneously pay attention to the eﬀect of the monetary
channels of monetary policy on investment opportunities.
This study provides valuable policy implications for monetary authorities and managers. First, policy-
makers should consider the eﬀects of diﬀerent policy instruments. Money supply and credit policy are eﬀective
tools for inﬂuencing corporate investment adjustment during contractionary monetary policy. Interest rates
are an eﬀective tool during expansionary monetary policy. Leverage has a greater eﬀect on corporate ﬁnancing
ability during expansionary monetary policy than contractionary monetary policy. Monetary authorities
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diﬃculties.
Second, policy-makers should focus on optimizing the corporate investment scale and improving corporate
investment eﬃciency to avoid over-investment and the resulting overcapacity. Company decision-makers need
to pre-judge the inﬂuence of diﬀerent policy instruments implemented by monetary authorities on corporate
ﬁnance and investment opportunities. They should adopt an eﬀective response in advance to ensure that the
level of corporate investment can maximize returns.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of the macro policies in
the institutional background of China and reﬁne the research questions. Section 3 presents the model design,
key concepts and deﬁnitions. Section 4 shows the sample selection and data sources. In Section 5, the empirical
results are reported and robustness tests are conducted. Section 6 presents the discussion and Section 7 sum-
marizes the main conclusions.
2. Institutional background analysis and research question reﬁnement
Before 1978, a single planned economic system was implemented in China. The government relied on
administration and planning to manage the economy, to poor eﬀect and economic ﬂuctuation. After the
reform and opening up, especially in the mid-1980s, a market-oriented reform model was established. The
Chinese economic environment and conditions were changing. In 1993, the Communist Party of China clearly
proclaimed that establishing a socialist market economic system was the goal of its economic reform at its
fourteenth conference. Since then, China has begun to gradually transform from a planned economy to a mar-
ket economy. The government has gradually shifted its macroeconomic management from relying mainly on
planning and executive orders to using market-based instruments, such as ﬁscal and monetary policies, in
accordance with the market-oriented reform.
The main objective of macroeconomic regulation and control is the pursuit of stable economic growth with
a reasonable level of the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The government’s macroeconomic control focuses on
adjusting the aggregate equilibrium with short-term, counter-cyclical, discretionary characteristics. Since 1997,
economic growth has been steady and the CPI has ﬂuctuated in a reasonable interval, as shown in Fig. 1. This
shows enhanced macro-control ability and the eﬀectiveness of market-based measures. As can be seen from
the M1 (a narrow measure of the money supply including currency and demand deposit) and credit scale
growth rates, the discretionary monetary policy mainly uses counter-cyclical measures to achieve steady eco-
nomic growth with a reasonable level of CPI.
China used to mainly use quantity-oriented monetary policy tools such as adjusting the statutory deposit
reserve ratio, open market operations and credit scale control. Price-based monetary policy tools based on
interest rates were used at a lower frequency. On 19 July 2013, approved by the State Council, the People’s
Bank of China decided to stop controlling the lending rates oﬀered by ﬁnancial institutions, which was an
important step in market-based interest rate reform.1 Under this reform, economic stimulus policies are no
longer able to depend on liquidity injections. The price adjustment mechanism in the market of credit supply
and demand is now active. This mechanism can optimize the allocation of credit resources and will have a
profound eﬀect on monetary policy transmission channels, mechanisms and eﬀects.
How do macroeconomic policies aﬀect a real economy? Do macro policies play their expected role? What
are their transmission mechanisms? To answer these questions, we need to analyze and test the mechanisms
and policy eﬀects of macroeconomic policies at the micro level. Previous studies mainly focus on monetary
policies’ transmission channels, mechanisms and consequences from a macro perspective. We analyze the
microscopic eﬀect of monetary policy transmission channels on corporate investment behavior.1 Approved by the State Council, the People’s Bank of China decided to remove controls on the lending interest rates oﬀered by ﬁnancial
institutions to their clients from 20 July 2013. The loan interest rates of ﬁnancial institutions are now determined autonomously by the
ﬁnancial institutions according to business principles. On 11 March 2014, Zhou Xiaochuan, the central bank governor, stated at a Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference that “deposit interest rate liberalization is certainly in the plan and probably can be realized
within one or two years.”
Figure 1. GDP growth, CPI growth and monetary policy from 1978 to 2012.
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For decades, macroeconomists have debated whether monetary policy has the same eﬀect on real output
during economic recessions and expansions. Before the 1920s, most economists believed that contractionary
and expansionary monetary policies had symmetric eﬀects, suggesting a linear relationship between money
supply and output. After the 1920s, economists gradually realized that a “tightening monetary policy can
eﬀectively restrain [an] overheated economy, but the eﬀect of [a] loose monetary policy in promoting economic
growth is not obvious, which implies the eﬀect of monetary policy is asymmetric.” In the 1930s, Keynes argued
with Pigou over whether monetary policies had less or no eﬀect on output during a severe economic downturn.
The limited eﬀectiveness of an expansionary monetary policy was partially explained when the concept of a
“liquidity trap” was introduced. In a liquidity trap, interest rates are so low that people believe that they can-
not drop further. The monetary policy then fails (Keynes, 1936).
At the beginning of the 1990s, studies that empirically test the asymmetric eﬀects of monetary policy gradu-
ally began appearing. Cover (1992) examines quarterly US post-war data from 1951 to 1987 and concludes
that positive money supply shocks have no eﬀect on output, whereas negative shocks reduce output.
Karras (1996) examines 18 European countries from the 1953–1990 period and ﬁnds that negative money sup-
ply shocks have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on output, whereas positive shocks have a statistically insigniﬁ-
cant eﬀect. Karras and Stokes (1999) ﬁnd that the eﬀects of money supply on prices and output of private
consumption are symmetric, whereas the response of ﬁxed investment is characterized by asymmetries, very
similar to those that aﬀect output.
The evidence from China for asymmetrical monetary shock eﬀects is mixed. Huang and Deng (2000) use
Chinese quarterly data from 1980 to 1997 and ﬁnd the eﬀects of monetary policies to be very diﬀerent between
China and Western countries. They ﬁnd that the M1 money supply shock has symmetric eﬀects, whereas the
M2 (a broad measure of the money supply including currency, demand deposit and savings deposits) money
supply shock has asymmetric eﬀects. This asymmetry is opposite to that in Western countries: a positive
money supply shock signiﬁcantly aﬀects output, whereas a negative money supply shock does not.
However, Liu (2002) examines China’s monthly data from 1990 to 2001 and suggests that the decelerating
eﬀect of a tight monetary policy is greater than the accelerating eﬀect of an expansionary monetary policy.
Chen et al. (2003) and Chen (2006) reach a similar conclusion to Liu after examining China’s quarterly data
from 1993–2002 and 1993–2005, respectively. Thus, due to diﬀerences in methods and sample windows, stud-
ies on the asymmetry of monetary policy eﬀects at the macro-level do not reach consistent conclusions.
Does monetary policy have an asymmetrical eﬀect on enterprise at the micro-level? Based on enterprise
micro data, Gong and Meng (2012), Jing et al. (2012) and Qian (2013) ﬁnd that expansionary and contrac-
tionary monetary policies have asymmetrical eﬀects on corporate investment. However, the asymmetry is
opposite to that found at the macro-level: expansionary monetary policy signiﬁcantly alleviates ﬁnancial con-
straints and promotes corporate investment, whereas contractionary monetary policy does not signiﬁcantly
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tia and sustainability. The transmission of monetary policy also has a lag eﬀect, between a policy’s imple-
mentation and managers in investment decision-making perceiving the implications of the policy.
Our ﬁrst concern is therefore how diﬀerent types of monetary policies aﬀect the adjustment of corporate
investment and whether expansionary and contractionary monetary policies have asymmetric eﬀects on cor-
porate investment.
2.2. Monetary policy transmission channels and the dynamic adjustment of investment in micro enterprises
Macroeconomic monetary policies have many relatively clear microscopic transmission channels, such as
the money channel (which includes interest rates, exchange rates and the asset prices approach) and general
credit channel of transmission (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). According to neo-
classical economics, monetary policymakers use their leverage over short-term interest rates to inﬂuence the
cost of capital and, consequently, spending on durable goods, such as ﬁxed investment, housing, inventories
and consumer durables. In turn, changes in aggregate demand aﬀect the level of corporate investment. When
the central bank raises interest rates, there is a corresponding increase in the cost of debt ﬁnancing and the
external ﬁnancing constraints of companies (Luo and Nie, 2012). Companies become more dependent on
internal ﬁnancing or reduce current investment to dynamically adjust their scale of investment.
Since 1990, monetary economists, such as Benanke, Gertler, Kashyap and Stein, have proposed the theory
of credit transmission of monetary policy when they study the role of micro-level enterprises in the monetary
policy transmission process. Credit transmission theory suggests that monetary policy aﬀects the availability
of ﬁnancing mainly through increasing or decreasing the supply of bank loans, thereby aﬀecting the supply of
corporate investment (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996). The credit rationing policy,
which is used as an important monetary policy instrument in China2, imposes a total credit limit. The total
amount of new loans issued by all commercial banks every year cannot exceed the annual credit stipulated
by the People’s Bank of China in principle (Su and Zeng, 2009). Through the bank lending channel, a tight
monetary policy reduces bank reserves and forces banks to shrink their loans, which reduces the commercial
bank loans available to enterprises (Kashyap et al., 1993). In addition, due to economic structural adjust-
ments, transformation and upgrading, banks are encouraged to issue loans to enterprises in the advanced
manufacturing and strategic emerging industries. In contrast, loans to high energy consumption, high emis-
sion industries and overcapacity industries are strictly controlled, which strengthens bank credit ﬁnancing con-
straints for some enterprises.
Researchers are interested in the eﬀect of monetary policies on corporate investment behavior through the
diﬀerent transmission channels. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) note that monetary policy has a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on long-term investment and ﬁnd that monetary policy inﬂuences corporate investment through both the
interest rate channel and the level of ﬁnancing constraints. Chatelain and Tiomo (2003) suggest that monetary
policy inﬂuences corporate investment through the interest rate channel, which can adjust the cost of capital,
and through the credit channel, which can adjust external ﬁnancing constraints. Zulkhibri (2013) ﬁnds that
monetary policy signiﬁcantly aﬀects ﬁrms’ access to external ﬁnance when interest rates are increasing.
Bank-dependent ﬁrms are the most vulnerable to this eﬀect. Internal ﬁnance is more important for high lever-
age ﬁrms during tight liquidity conditions.
Studies on Chinese companies draw similar conclusions. Zhang et al. (2012) study the dual eﬀects of mone-
tary policy on corporate investment supply and demand. They ﬁnd that changes in monetary policy change
investment opportunities, aﬀect a company’s willingness to invest through monetary channels, change the
company’s ability to raise funds and the supply of investment funds through the credit channel and ultimately
aﬀect the company’s investment decisions. Monetary policies also aﬀect corporate investment in companies
with diﬀerent ﬁnancing constraints through diﬀerent transmission channels. The monetary channel has a lar-
ger eﬀect on low ﬁnancing constraints companies, whereas the credit channel has a larger eﬀect on high2 On 1 January 1998, the People’s Bank of China abolished the control of the size of loans by state-owned commercial banks, which had
been practiced for nearly ﬁve decades. At the end of 2007, to eﬀectively control the high inﬂation rate, the central bank enabled credit size
control again.
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policies have heterogeneous eﬀects on corporate investment behavior. The inﬂuence of monetary policies is
constrained by the liquidity, inventory, size and asset–liability ratio of a ﬁrm. Firms with higher liquidity,
lower inventory levels and lower asset–liability ratios are less sensitive to the eﬀects of the two kinds of mone-
tary policies. The larger a ﬁrm is, the less it is aﬀected by quantity-oriented monetary policies, but the more
sensitive it is to price-based monetary policies.
Fig. 2 presents the transmission channels and mechanisms by which monetary policy inﬂuences corporate
investment behavior. When monetary policy changes (for example, from easing to tightening), it aﬀects
corporate investment opportunities and external ﬁnancing constraints through the credit and monetary
channels, respectively. Rational decision-makers in enterprises therefore actively consider adjusting their
investment plans and scale to respond to these changes. From the perspective of credit ﬁnancing constraints
caused by the credit transmission channel, during a monetary policy contraction, corporate credit ﬁnancing
constraints and the opportunity cost of investment increase as the credit supply decreases. According to the
net present value (NPV) rule and the theory of maximizing proﬁt, the enterprise will reduce its investment
projects to adjust its investment scale. During a loose monetary policy, external ﬁnancing constraints and
the cost of capital decline as the credit supply increases. According to the NPV rule, many projects with
original negative NPV become proﬁtable, so enterprises will expand their scale of investment to maximize
proﬁt.
From the perspective of the monetary transmission channel, during expansionary monetary policy, the
total market demand increases as the base money supply increases. Enterprises expand production and
increase their scale of investment due to the increase in investment opportunities. During tight monetary pol-
icy, the total market demand decreases and the cost of capital rises as the money supply decreases. Companies
reduce their scale of investment as the reduction in investment opportunities causes investment demand to
decrease.
Is there a linear relationship between the changes in monetary policy and corporate investment? Is there an
asymmetric eﬀect? Do diﬀerent monetary policy transmission channels and tools have the same eﬀect on the
adjustment speed of corporate investment? All of these questions require in-depth empirical research.
Leverage plays an important moderating role in the eﬀect of monetary policy on corporate investment.
Lang et al. (1996) show that the eﬀect of monetary policy changes on ﬁrms with high levels of leverage is larger
than on those with low levels of leverage. There is a negative relationship between leverage and future growth
at the ﬁrm level. Hu (1999) ﬁnds that monetary contractions reduce the growth of investment more in highly
leveraged ﬁrms than in less leveraged ﬁrms. The results suggest that a broad credit channel for monetary pol-
icy exists and that it can operate through leverage, as adverse monetary shocks aggravate real debt burdens
and raise the eﬀective costs of investment.
Based on the above analysis, we empirically examine the eﬀects of diﬀerent monetary policy channels on the
speed of corporate investment adjustment and whether there is an asymmetric eﬀect. We test the role of lever-
age in the eﬀect of monetary policy on corporate investment.M
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Figure 2. The transmission channels and mechanisms of monetary policy and its inﬂuence on investment behavior.
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3.1. Dynamic adjustment model of corporate investment
We design the dynamic adjustment model of corporate investment with the eﬀect of monetary policy by
integrating Richardson’s (2006) investment eﬃciency model and Flannery and Rangan’s (2006) partial adjust-
ment model. The model is derived as follows.
Step 1: Estimated model of expected investment.
According to Richardson (2006), there is an optimal scale of corporate investment. It depends on the last
operating conditions of a company in a given external environment. We set the estimated model of expected
corporate investment as follows:Ii;t ¼ aX i;t1; ð1Þ
where Ii;t represents the expected investment of company i in year t and X i;t1 is a vector of ﬁrm characteristic
variables that aﬀect the expected investment.
Step 2: Standard partial adjustment model.
In a frictionless world, ﬁrms quickly move back to their target level, which is the level they choose in the
absence of any adjustment costs. However, in the presence of adjustment costs, ﬁrms may partially adjust back
to their expected level of investment over multiple periods. We use Flannery and Rangan’s (2006) standard
partial adjustment model to estimate the speed of the adjustment of corporate investment to the next period
target level.
The standard partial adjustment model of corporate investment is as follows:I i;t  I i;t1 ¼ kðIi;t  I i;t1Þ þ /i;t; ð2Þ
where I i;t and I i;t1 represent the actual investment level for ﬁrm i in periods t and t  1 and k represents the
adjustment speed of corporate investment to the target level from period t  1 to period t. The larger the value
of k, the faster the adjustment speed. k = 1 indicates that ﬁrms fully adjust for any deviation away from their
target investment level. We expect k to be less than 1 in the presence of adjustment costs.
Step 3: Integrated partial adjustment model.
Following Flannery and Rangan, we substitute (1) into (2) and rearrange. The model of integrated corpo-
rate investment partial adjustment model is:I i;t ¼ ð1 kÞI i;t1 þ ðkaÞX i;t1 þ xi;t: ð3Þ
Step 4: Dynamic adjustment model of investment with monetary policy eﬀects.
Relaxing the assumption of a ﬁxed external economic policy, we argue that a manager develops investment
plans at the beginning of each year according to the operating conditions in the previous year and dynamically
adjusts them according to this year’s changes in macroeconomic policies. To investigate the eﬀects of mone-
tary policy and its transmission channels on the adjustment speed of corporate investment, we develop an
extended integrated partial adjustment model. We add the interaction term between the variables for the cur-
rent monetary policy period and the lagged variable of investment (MCt  I i;t1) in the right of model (3), as
follows:I i;t ¼ ð1 kÞI i;t1 þ gMCt  I i;t1 þ ðkaÞX i;t1 þ xi;t; ð4Þ
where MCt represents monetary policy variables, proxied by the M1 and M2 growth rates and loan interest
rates in the monetary channel and credit growth rates in the credit channel. The adjustment speed of corporate
investment becomes k0 ¼ k g MCt. AsMCt is generally positive, when the coeﬃcient on the interaction item
is signiﬁcantly negative, the adjustment speed of corporate investment increases with an increase in the
monetary policy variables, and vice versa. The calculations and deﬁnitions of the variables are shown in
Table 1.
Table 1
Variable deﬁnitions.
Variable Name Deﬁnition and calculation
Dependent variables
It Investment Cash for buying ﬁxed assets, intangible assets and other long-term assets/total assets
Isdt Change rate of
investment
(It  It1)/It1
Variables of interest
MP Monetary policy
states
MP equals 1 if in a tight monetary policy period, and 0 otherwise
M1 Annual growth rate
of M1
(Money supply M1 in this year – Money supply M1 in the previous year)/Money supply M1 in the
previous year
M2 Annual growth rate
of M2
(Money supply M2 in this year – Money supply M2 in the previous year)/Money supply M2 in the
previous year
Credit Credit growth rate Growth rate of annual cumulative new RMB loans issued by ﬁnancial institutions
R Loan interest rates Weighted average interest rate of medium- and long-term loans with maturities in the 1–3 year
range. If the benchmark interest rate is adjusted several times within a year, the annual weighted
lending rate is calculated by the monthly weighted average of each benchmark interest rate in a year
Control variables
Lnsize Asset scale Natural logarithm of total assets
Growth Growth potential Growth rate of operating income
Cash Cash holdings (Cash + short-term investments or tradable ﬁnancial assets)/total assets
Lev Leverage level Total liabilities/total assets
Return Market return Cumulative return rate from May in year t to April in year t + 1
Listage Number of years
listed
The number of years between the annual ﬁnancial report and the ﬁrm’s IPO
Industry Industry Industry dummies, which equal 1 if the observation belongs to each particular industry, and 0
otherwise
Year Year dummies, which equal 1 if the observation belongs to a particular year, and 0 otherwise
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According to Richardson’s (2006) deﬁnition, total investment expenditure can then be split into (i) required
investment expenditure to maintain assets in place and (ii) investment expenditure on new projects. We deﬁne
corporate investment as new investment with a proxy using cash expenditure for buying ﬁxed assets, intangible
assets and other long-term assets and standardizing with total assets to eliminate the inﬂuence of size
diﬀerences.
Following Richardson (2006), we estimate expected investment according to the following regression
speciﬁcation:I i;t ¼ b0 þ b1Growthi;t1 þ b2Levi;t1 þ b3Cashi;t1 þ b4Listagei;t1 þ b5Lnsizei;t1 þ b6Returni;t1
þ b7I i;t1 þ
X
Industry þ
X
Year þ ei;t: ð5ÞThe determinants of investment decisions include measures of growth opportunities, leverage, the level of
cash, ﬁrm age, ﬁrm size, past stock returns, prior level of ﬁrm investment, industry ﬁxed eﬀects and annual
ﬁxed eﬀects.
3.3. Deﬁnition of monetary policy states and transmission channels
3.3.1. Deﬁnition of monetary policy states
The government often describes three monetary policy states: active or expansionary monetary policy, pru-
dent monetary policy and tight monetary policy. However, monetary policy is often divided into tightening
and expansionary monetary policies, based on diﬀerent indicators in the academic literature.
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below:
(1) Monetary policy sentiment index of bankers
Zhu and Lu (2009) and Ye and Zhu (2009) measure the degree of tightening monetary policy using the
monetary policy sentiment index from the bankers’ survey carried out by the People’s Bank of China and
the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The survey records bankers’ assessments of monetary policy as
too loose, partially loose, moderate, tight, too tight and unknown. They use “too tight” to measure the degree
of monetary policy tightening. The higher the ratio of bankers who believe that a monetary policy is too tight,
the tighter monetary policy is. Qian (2013) use “moderate” as a measure of monetary policy. They judge the
annual monetary policy direction as loose when the number of votes for “moderate” is higher than the average
value of the investigation window, and otherwise judge the direction to be easing. As only votes for
“moderate” are available for recent years, we use Qian’s method to judge the monetary policy direction.
(2) The broad money supply (M2) growth rate
Mayer et al. (1996) show a close relationship between money supply and nominal GDP in developed coun-
tries. In the major countries, the stock of money and GDP both grow in the same direction. Shirakawa (2001)
suggests that nominal GDP makes a nearly consistent growth with money supply (M2 + CDs (large time
deposits, institutional money-market fund balances)) in Japan. Jing et al. (2012) use the annual broad money
supply (M2) growth rate as a measure of monetary policy.
Li and Wang (2011) use the diﬀerence between the nominal GDP growth rate and M2 growth rate to mea-
sure the monetary policy state. The nominal GDP growth in the general sense represents the demand for cur-
rency for economic development, whereas theM2 growth rate reﬂects the money supply level. If the diﬀerence
between the two is positive, there is a money supply gap and the government implements contractionary
monetary policy. If the diﬀerence is negative, then the money supply exceeds the demand of economic devel-
opment and the government implements expansionary monetary policy.
(3) Benchmark interest rates and the legal deposit reserve rate
Li and Wang (2011) also use one-year lending interest rates as a measure of monetary policy. Rao and Jiang
(2011) and Ma and Hu (2012) judge the monetary policy state according to the adjustment direction of the
benchmark interest rate and the legal deposit reserve rate implemented by the central bank.
As shown in Table 2, 2006 and 2008–2010 are classiﬁed diﬀerently by the above three mainstream meth-
ods of determining the direction of the monetary policy. According to majority rule, we judge 2006 and
2008 to be tight monetary policy years and 2009 and 2010 to be loose monetary policy years. We divide
the sample window into contraction years (2006, 2007, 2008 and 2011) and expansion years (2005, 2009,
2010 and 2012).
3.3.2. Deﬁnition of monetary policy transmission channels
Monetary policy transmission channels generally include the monetary channel (including interest rates,
exchange rates and asset prices) and credit channel. The monetary channel inﬂuences M1 and M2 supply
to achieve policy goals through monetary policy tools, such as interest rates, exchange rates, deposit
reserves, open market operations and standing lending facilities.3 As M1 reﬂects the real purchasing power
in an economy, which represents the market demand and reﬂects investment opportunities, we use the M1
growth rate as the main proxy variable of the monetary channel. We use the M2 growth rate and weighted
average loan interest rate of loans with maturity in the one to three year range as robustness test
variables.3 In January 2013, the People’s Bank of China set up standing loan facilities which provide liquidity support for ﬁnancial institutions.
Table 2
Deﬁnition of the annual monetary policy direction.
Indicators Contraction
years
Expansion
years
Criteria for classiﬁcation References
The monetary policy
sentiment index
2007, 2008,
2009, 2011
2005, 2006,
2010, 2012
Following the monetary policy sentiment index of
bankers, we use the number of votes for “moderate” as
a measure of monetary policy. The annual monetary
policy direction is loose when the number is higher than
the average value of the investigation window,
otherwise it is tight
Qian (2013)
The broad money supply
(M2) growth rate
2006, 2007,
2008, 2011
2005, 2009,
2010, 2012
If the nominal GDP growth rate is more than the M2
growth rate, the monetary policy that year is
contractionary, otherwise it is expansionary
Li and Wang
(2011)
Benchmark interest rates
and the legal deposit
reserve rate
2006, 2007,
2010, 2011
2005, 2008,
2009, 2012
We use the adjustment direction of the benchmark
interest rate and the legal deposit reserve rate. The
monetary policy is contractionary when the central
bank raises the rates, otherwise it is expansionary
Rao and Jiang,
(2011), Ma and Hu
(2012)
Comprehensive
judgment
2006, 2007,
2008, 2011
2005, 2009,
2010, 2012
We follow the majority rule. We judge the monetary
policy state to be that of the majority of the above three
methods
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ﬁnancing supply to achieve a policy goal. The monetary policy tools of the credit channel are the total credit
limit and credit rationing, which aﬀect the scale and structure of total credit. New loans by ﬁnancial institu-
tions reﬂect the total credit supply, which aﬀects the degree of external ﬁnancing constraints that enterprises
experience. We use the annual cumulative new RMB loans growth rate of ﬁnancial institutions as the proxy
variable for monetary policy through the credit channel.4. Sample selection and data sources
The initial sample includes all A-share listed companies from 2005 to 2012. The ﬁnal sample is obtained by
ﬁltering with the following conditions. (1) Observations with missing variables are dropped. (2) Financial and
insurance companies are removed. (3) Observations with leverage levels that fall outside the outlier leverage
levels of [0, 1] or investment rates equal to 0 are excluded. (4) Newly listed and specially treated companies are
removed.
To meet the availability of the lag variable, we use a balanced panel data set of 1157 listed companies over
the eight-year period. The ﬁnal sample includes 9256 ﬁrm-year observations. Financial data of the listed com-
panies are sourced from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research and Wind Information Co., Ltd.
databases. Monetary policy variables are collected from the website of the People’s Bank of China and the
National Bureau of Standards of China. The money and credit supplies are taken from the Monetary
Policy Implementation Report and the monetary policy sentiment index of bankers is taken from the
Chinese Bankers Survey Report.
Table 3 shows the sample by industry sector. The industry classiﬁcation is based on the Industrial
Distribution of Listed Companies index issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).
The manufacturing sector accounts for 55.2% of the sample. To make the sample distribution by industry sec-
tor more even, we use two-digit industry codes for the manufacturing sector to control for industry factors in
the empirical estimation.5. Model estimation and empirical analysis
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics of the monetary policy variables. It demonstrates four proxy variables
for the monetary policy transmission channels of the monetary policy states. There is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence
Table 3
Sample distribution by industry sector.
Industry (CSRC code) Frequency Percent (%)
Agriculture (A) 177 1.91
Mining (B) 251 2.71
Manufacturing (C) 5109 55.2
Electricity, Gas, Water Supply (D) 496 5.36
Construction (E) 144 1.56
Transportation and Storage (F) 385 4.16
Information, Technology (G) 456 4.93
Wholesale and Retail Trade (H) 728 7.87
Real Estate (J) 777 8.39
Social Services (K) 297 3.21
Transmission, Culture (L) 105 1.13
Conglomerate (M) 344 3.72
Total 9256 100
Table 4
Descriptive statistics of the monetary policy variables.
MP Statistical indicators M1 M2 R Credit
0 Mean 0.1795 0.1971 0.0574 0.3396
Standard deviation (Sd) 0.0984 0.0506 0.0039 0.6776
1 Mean 0.1382 0.1596 0.0642 0.0870
Sd 0.0500 0.0156 0.0061 0.2222
0–1 Diﬀerence 0.0414*** 0.0375*** 0.0068*** 0.2525***
t-statistic 27.80 53.19 66.15 26.61
Total Mean 0.1565 0.1762 0.0612 0.1993
Sd 0.0782 0.0403 0.0062 0.4972
Coeﬃcient of variation 49.97% 22.87% 10.13% 249.47%
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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policy states is reasonable. From the coeﬃcient of variation, monetary policy is mainly implemented through
quantitative tools in the monetary channels to adjust the money supply. The price instrument with interest
rates as the core has a small variation. The coeﬃcient of variation of the credit growth rate is 249.47%, which
suggests that monetary policy is mainly implemented through credit scale control.
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics for the main corporate variables. To avoid the inﬂuence of outliers,
all of the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. As shown in Table 5, the average com-
pany in the sample has a listed age of 10.4, investment rate of 5.38%, leverage of 51.09%, cash holdings ratio of
15.59%, annual operating income growth of 14.92% and annual market return of 36.69%.Table 5
Descriptive statistics of the main corporate variables.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Min. P25 Median P75 Max.
Age 9256 10.43 4.14 1 8 10 13 22
I 9256 0.0538 0.0499 0.0018 0.0147 0.0386 0.0771 0.1862
Lev 9256 0.5109 0.1794 0.1022 0.3849 0.5283 0.6502 0.7949
Cash 9256 0.1559 0.1080 0.0284 0.0777 0.1299 0.2054 0.5477
Growth 9256 0.1492 0.2635 0.2936 0.0168 0.1236 0.2812 0.7851
Return 9256 0.3669 0.8455 0.6552 0.2808 0.0733 0.9444 2.1408
Lnsize 9256 21.7705 1.2007 17.5367 20.9288 21.6631 22.4712 27.8520
Table 6
Estimating expected corporate investment.
Dependent variables It
Independent variable Predicted sign B t-statistic
It1 + 0.510
*** 59.75
Levt1  0.0123*** 4.39
Lnsizet1 + 0.00241
*** 5.45
Casht1 + 0.0356
*** 8.15
Growtht1 + 0.00345
*** 3.03
Returnt1 + 0.00356
*** 4.40
Aget1  0.000565*** 4.03
Constant +/ 0.0268*** 2.84
Industry / Yes –
Year / Yes –
R-square 0.4037
Wald chi2 6242.99
N 9256
Note: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
102 Q. Fu, X. Liu / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 91–1095.2. Empirical results
5.2.1. Estimating the expected level of capital investment
Adjustment model (4) internalizes the estimate of expected corporate investment. The premise of this inter-
nalization is that the target level of corporate investment can be appropriately ﬁtted by the ﬁrm characteristic
variables. We must therefore test and discuss the ﬁtting eﬀect of the expected corporate investment estimation
model (5).
Table 6 reports the estimates of expected corporate investment. The sign of the coeﬃcient is consistent with
theoretical expectations and similar studies (e.g., Richardson, 2006). The estimates of all of the parameters are
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The goodness of ﬁt (0.4) is high. We therefore believe that model (5) is suitable for
estimating the expected investment level with the selected ﬁrm characteristic variables.
5.2.2. Monetary policy states and dynamic adjustment of corporate investment
Table 7 reports the estimates of the eﬀect of the monetary policy states on the adjustment speed of corpo-
rate investment. The regression results show that the coeﬃcient of I t1 is 0.499 and the coeﬃcient of MP  I t1
is 0.0218. According to the economic signiﬁcance of the model, the adjustment speed is
k0 ¼ 0:501 0:0218 MP . The results show that corporate investment adjusts back to the target level faster
during loose monetary policies than tight policies. Monetary policy has asymmetric eﬀects on corporate invest-
ment in expansionary and tight periods. A typical ﬁrm closes about 50.1% of the gap between the actual and
target investment levels in one year of loose monetary policy, with an adjustment HALF-LIFE4 of 1.38 years.
In contrast, it can only correct about 47.92% of the gap between the actual and target investment levels in a
year of tight monetary policy, with an adjustment HALF-LIFE of 1.45 years.
5.2.3. Monetary transmission channels and the dynamic adjustment of corporate investment
To test whether monetary policy transmission channels have an asymmetric eﬀect on the adjustment speed
during diﬀerent monetary policy states, we use simulation evidence to determine the signiﬁcance of the
observed diﬀerences in the coeﬃcient estimates reported in the literature (Cleary, 1999; Islam and
Mozumdar, 2007; Lian et al., 2010). A bootstrapping procedure is used to calculate empirical p-values that
estimate the likelihood of obtaining the observed diﬀerences in coeﬃcient estimates if the true coeﬃcients
are, in fact, equal.4 The adjustment HALF-LIFE is (ln2)/k, where k is the adjustment speed.
Table 7
Estimating the eﬀect of monetary policy states on the adjustment speed of corporate investment.
Dependent variables It
Independent variable B t-statistic
It1 0.499
*** 49.29
MP * It1 0.0218
* 1.94
Levt1 0.0123*** 4.40
Lnsizet1 0.00237
*** 5.46
Casht1 0.0363
*** 8.39
Growtht1 0.00396
*** 3.56
Returnt1 0.00286
*** 6.20
Aget1 0.000604*** 5.13
Constant 0.0273*** 2.98
Industry Yes /
Year No /
Wald chi2 6222.93 /
R-square 0.4028 /
N 9256 /
Note: **p < 0.05.
* p < 0.10.
*** p < 0.01.
Table 8
Estimating the eﬀect of the monetary channel on the adjustment speed of corporate investment.
It Full sample Expansion (MP = 0) Contraction (MP = 1) Empirical p-value
It1 0.558*** 0.526*** 0.630*** 0.3010
(40.52) (29.98) (24.53)
M1
* It1 0.300*** 0.117 0.777*** 0.0780*
(4.42) (1.54) (5.04)
Levt1 0.0122*** 0.0125*** 0.0115***
(4.36) (3.28) (2.81)
Lnsizet1 0.00230*** 0.00104* 0.00353***
(5.31) (1.79) (5.45)
Casht1 0.0355*** 0.0274*** 0.0436***
(8.22) (4.65) (6.85)
Growtht1 0.00374*** 0.00524*** 0.00229
(3.35) (3.30) (1.45)
Returnt1 0.00286*** 0.00334*** 0.00207***
(6.35) (4.75) (3.19)
Aget1 0.000656*** 0.000754*** 0.000646***
(5.58) (4.81) (3.48)
Constant 0.0250*** 0.00105 0.0494***
(2.74) (0.09) (3.57)
Industry Yes Yes Yes
Year No No No
Wald chi2 6249.38 3298.43 3035.18
R-square 0.4038 0.4177 0.3976
N 9256 4628 4628
Note: (1) t statistics in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. (2) Empirical p-values are generated using 1000 bootstrapping
simulations to test the diﬀerences between the coeﬃcient estimates of MC  I t1.
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investment. The results show that the coeﬃcient of I t1 is 0.558 and the coeﬃcient of M1  I t1 is 0.300 when
we use the M1 growth rate as the proxy variable of the monetary channel. According to the economic signiﬁ-
cance of the model, the adjustment speed is k0 ¼ 0:442þ 0:3 M1. In our sample interval, a typical ﬁrm closes
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growth rate of 6.49%, corresponding to an adjustment HALF-LIFE of 1.50 years. In contrast, it closes about
53.905% of the gap between the actual and target levels in 2009, which has the highest M1 growth rate of
32.35%, corresponding to an adjustment HALF-LIFE of 1.29 years. The results show that expanding the
monetary policy by increasing the growth rate of M1 can speed up the adjustment of corporate investment.
The change in the M1 supply has a greater eﬀect on the adjustment speed of corporate investment in tight
monetary policy periods than in loose monetary policy periods. The observed diﬀerences in the coeﬃcient esti-
mates indicate that monetary policy has an asymmetric eﬀect on corporate investment in the monetary chan-
nel, at the 10% signiﬁcance level. We can conclude that changing the money supply through monetary
channels has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on corporate investment adjustment in tight monetary policy periods, but a
non-signiﬁcant eﬀect in loose monetary policy periods.
5.2.4. Credit channel and dynamic adjustment of corporate investment
Table 9 reports the estimates of the eﬀects of the credit channel on the speed of corporate investment adjust-
ment. The results show that the coeﬃcient of I t1 is 0.522 and the coeﬃcient of Credit  I t1 is 0.0449 when
we use credit growth rate as the proxy variable of the credit channel. According to the economic signiﬁcance of
the model, the adjustment speed is k0 ¼ 0:478þ 0:0449  Credit. In our sample interval, a typical ﬁrm closes
about 46.5% of the gap between the actual and target investment levels in 2010, which has the lowest credit
growth rate of 28.90%, corresponding to an adjustment HALF-LIFE of 1.49 years. In contrast, it corrects
about 54.45% of the gap between the actual and target levels in 2009, which has the highest credit growth rate
of 148.13%, corresponding to an adjustment HALF-LIFE of 1.27 years. The results show that loose monetary
policy can speed up corporate investment adjustment by increasing the credit supply. A change in credit sup-
ply has a greater eﬀect on the speed of corporate investment adjustment in tight monetary policy periods than
in loose monetary policy periods. The observed diﬀerences in the coeﬃcient estimates indicate that the credit
channel does not have an asymmetric eﬀect, at the 10% signiﬁcance level.Table 9
Estimating the eﬀect of the credit channel on the adjustment speed of corporate investment.
It Full sample Expansion (MP = 0) Contraction (MP = 1) Empirical p-value
It1 0.522*** 0.514*** 0.558*** 0.2450
(57.69) (41.73) (36.94)
Credit * It1 0.0449*** 0.0252** 0.216*** 0.2330
(3.95) (2.09) (4.79)
Levt1 0.0123*** 0.0124*** 0.0116***
(4.39) (3.27) (2.82)
Lnsizet1 0.00232*** 0.00105* 0.00353***
(5.37) (1.81) (5.43)
Casht1 0.0357*** 0.0276*** 0.0437***
(8.25) (4.70) (6.86)
Growtht1 0.00397*** 0.00534*** 0.00197
(3.57) (3.38) (1.24)
Returnt1 0.00252*** 0.00275*** 0.00198***
(5.39) (3.60) (3.04)
Aget1 0.000634*** 0.000733*** 0.000694***
(5.40) (4.67) (3.66)
Constant 0.0258*** 0.000662 0.0485***
(2.82) (0.05) (3.50)
Industry Yes Yes Yes
Year No No No
Wald chi2 6242.71 3301.85 3031.04
R-square 0.4035 0.4179 0.3973
N 9256 4628 4628
Note: (1) t statistics in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. (2) Empirical p-values are generated using 1000 bootstrapping
simulations to test the diﬀerences between the coeﬃcient estimates of MC  I t1.
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We test the robustness of our results on the asymmetric eﬀect in the monetary channel by repeating the test
process using the M2 growth rate and lending interest rates as proxies for the monetary channel of monetary
policy. The results of the two tests, shown in Table 10, indicate that the diﬀerences in the coeﬃcient estimates
of the interaction term are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The results are therefore robust.
The results show that the coeﬃcient of I t1 is 0.598 and the coeﬃcient of M2  I t1 is 0.490 when we use
the M2 growth rate as the proxy variable of the monetary channel. The adjustment speed is then
k0 ¼ 0:402þ 0:49 M2. In our sample interval, a typical ﬁrm closes about 46.87% of the gap between the
actual and target investment levels in 2011, which has the lowest M2 growth rate of 13.61%, corresponding
to an adjustment HALF-LIFE of 1.48 years. In contrast, it corrects about 53.76% of the gap between the
actual and target levels in 2009, which has the highest M2 growth rate of 27.68%, corresponding to an adjust-
ment HALF-LIFE of 1.29 years. The results show that expanding monetary policy to increase the growth rate
of M2 can speed up the adjustment of corporate investment. The eﬀect of the change in M2 supply on the
adjustment speed of corporate investment is signiﬁcantly greater in tight monetary policy periods than in loose
monetary policy periods.
The results show that the coeﬃcient of I t1 is 0.375 and the coeﬃcient of R  I t1 is 2.191 when we use
lending rates as the proxy variable of the monetary channel. The adjustment speed is then
k0 ¼ 0:625 2:191  R. In our sample interval, a typical ﬁrm closes about 50.67% of the gap between the
actual and target investment levels in 2009, which has the lowest lending rates of 5.40%, corresponding
to an adjustment HALF-LIFE of 1.37 years. In contrast, it corrects about 46.57% of the gap between
the actual and target levels in 2008, which has the highest lending rates of 7.27%, corresponding to an
adjustment HALF-LIFE of 1.49 years. The results show that contracting monetary policy by raising lending
rates can slow down the adjustment of corporate investment. The eﬀect of the change in lending rates on the
adjustment speed of corporate investment is non-signiﬁcantly greater in loose monetary policy periods than
in tight monetary policy periods.Table 10
Robustness test results.
It Full sample Expansion (MP = 0) Contraction (MP = 1) Empirical p-value
It1 0.598*** 0.561*** 0.923*** 0.2160
(23.15) (17.86) (9.30)
M2
* It1 0.490*** 0.285* 2.474*** 0.0240**
(3.62) (1.91) (4.12)
Constant 0.0258*** 0.00168 0.0521***
(2.82) (0.14) (3.78)
X and Industry Yes Yes Yes
Wald chi2 6238.61 3300.60 3021.29
R-square 0.4034 0.4178 0.3965
N 9256 4628 4628
It1 0.375*** 0.333*** 0.371*** 0.3730
(6.31) (2.78) (2.83)
R * It1 2.191** 3.001 2.208 0.0030***
(2.30) (1.45) (1.12)
Constant 0.0262*** 0.00261 0.0593***
(2.86) (0.21) (4.32)
X and Industry Yes Yes Yes
Wald chi2 6225.49 3297.94 2995.27
R-square 0.4029 0.4176 0.3944
N 9256 4628 4628
Note: (1) t statistics in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. (2) Empirical p-values are generated using 1000 bootstrapping
simulations to test the diﬀerences between the coeﬃcient estimates of MC  I t1. (3) We control for the related variables (X) and industry,
but do not report them as there are too many variables.
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6.1. Monetary policy and dynamic adjustment of corporate investment: role of leverage
The literature shows that the leverage level plays an important moderating role in the eﬀect of monetary
policy on the adjustment of corporate investment. We examine the eﬀect of the leverage level on the relation-
ship between the adjustment of corporate investment and monetary policy in diﬀerent states. The results are
shown in Table 11.
The results show that the coeﬃcient of I t1 is 0.323 and the coeﬃcient of Lev  I t1 is 0.349. According to the
economic signiﬁcance of the model, the adjustment speed is k0 ¼ 0:677 0:349  Lev. A typical ﬁrm in our
sample closes about 64.13% of the gap between the actual and target investment levels in one year when lever-
age is at its lowest level of 10.219%, corresponding to an adjustment HALF-LIFE of 1.08 years. In contrast, it
corrects about 39.96% of the gap between the actual and target levels when leverage is at its highest level of
79.486%, corresponding to an adjustment HALF-LIFE of 1.73 years. The results show that the higher the
leverage, the slower the adjustment speed of corporate investment. This result is due to the ﬁnancing con-
straints that reduce the external ﬁnancing supply for corporate investment. Leverage has a greater eﬀect on
the adjustment speed of corporate investment in loose monetary policy periods than in tight monetary policy
periods. The observed diﬀerences in the coeﬃcient estimates indicate that there is an asymmetric eﬀect at the
10% signiﬁcance level. The implication for policy-makers is that monetary authorities should pay more atten-
tion to ﬁrms with high leverage during loose monetary policy periods to solve their ﬁnancing diﬃculties.6.2. Diﬀerences between the relative and absolute speed of corporate investment adjustment
The empirical investigation above reports the eﬀect of monetary policy on the relative speed of adjustment
to the optimal level of investment. However, the eﬀect of monetary policy on the absolute speed of adjustment
of corporate investment is a more intuitive measure, which is the rate of change in the level of investment from
one year to another. We repeat the empirical estimates using the absolute adjustment speed and compare the
results. The empirical results of model (6) are shown in Table 12.Table
Estima
It
It1
Lev * I
Consta
X and
Wald
R-squa
N
Note:
simula
but doIsdt ¼ ðI i;t  I i;t1Þ=I i;t1 ¼ aMCt þ bX i;t1 þ di;t: ð6ÞThe results show that the eﬀects of monetary policy variables on the absolute speed of adjustment of cor-
porate investment are not signiﬁcant, except for the eﬀects ofM1 and lending rates R in tight monetary policy
periods. However, lending rates have a greater eﬀect on the absolute adjustment speed of corporate investment
in tight monetary policy periods than in loose monetary policy periods, which is inconsistent with the results11
ting the eﬀect of leverage on the adjustment speed of corporate investment.
Full sample Expansion (MP = 0) Contraction (MP = 1) Empirical p-value
0.323*** 0.315*** 0.335*** 0.3820
(13.93) (9.83) (9.99)
t1 0.349*** 0.349*** 0.344*** 0.0640*
(8.66) (6.36) (5.82)
nt 0.0142 0.0120 0.0466***
(1.54) (0.97) (3.37)
Industry Yes Yes Yes
chi2 6342.13 3363.81 3049.19
re 0.4074 0.4224 0.3987
9256 4628 4628
(1) t statistics in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. (2) Empirical p-values are generated using 1000 bootstrapping
tions to test the diﬀerences between the coeﬃcient estimates of MC  I t1. (3) We control for the related variables (X) and industry,
not report them as there are too many variables.
Table 12
Estimating the eﬀect of monetary policy on the absolute speed of adjustment of corporate investment.
Isdt Full sample Expansion (MP = 0) Contraction (MP = 1) Empirical p-value
M1 0.293 0.150 1.570
* 0.4410
(0.71) (0.31) (1.66)
M2 0.304 0.446 0.583 0.4780
(0.37) (0.47) (0.15)
R 4.877 2.012 25.44* 0.4670
(0.82) (0.15) (1.65)
Credit 0.00198 0.0763 0.386 0.4470
(0.03) (0.86) (1.32)
Levt1 0.103 0.751** 0.541* 0.4830
(0.48) (2.46) (1.80)
Note: (1) t statistics in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. (2) Empirical p-values are generated using 1000 bootstrapping
simulations to test the diﬀerences between the coeﬃcient estimates of MC  I t1. (3) We control for the related variables and industry, but
do not report them because there are too many variables.
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asymmetric eﬀects on the absolute speed of adjustment of corporate investment under diﬀerent monetary pol-
icy states.
The diﬀerences in the estimation results using relative and absolute adjustment speeds of corporate invest-
ment may be caused by the measure perspective of the two kinds of speed. The relative speed of adjustment
adjusts to the optimal investment level, which takes into account the eﬀects of over- or under-investment. The
absolute speed of adjustment is based only on the rate of change in corporate investment. Therefore, we argue
that the relative speed of adjustment is suitable for choosing monetary policy to optimize the investment scale.
For example, in response to the international ﬁnancial crisis of 2007, the Chinese government implemented an
expansionary monetary policy and proactive ﬁscal policy with a 4 trillion investment plan from 2008.
Although these measures played a short-term role in economic recovery, over-investment has resulted in
overcapacity and redundant construction, which is harmful to the long-term development of the economy.7. Conclusions and implications
Based on China’s A-share listed ﬁrms from 2005 to 2012, we investigate the eﬀects of monetary policy on
the direction and speed of corporate investment adjustment. The results show that the adjustment speed of
corporate investment is faster in expansionary monetary policy periods than in contractionary monetary pol-
icy periods. The monetary channel, proxied by M1, M2 and loan interest rates, has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
adjustment of corporate investment. This eﬀect is asymmetric across diﬀerent monetary policy states. The
credit channel, proxied by credit scale, has a signiﬁcant, but not asymmetric eﬀect on the adjustment of cor-
porate investment. Leverage is an important factor for restricting the adjustment of corporate investment. The
higher the leverage, the slower the adjustment speed of corporate investment.
Monetary authorities should pay attention to the eﬀect of monetary policy on the adjustment of corporate
investment. Expansionary monetary policy more eﬀectively adjusts corporate investment than tightening pol-
icy. A change in the growth rate of M1 or M2 has a signiﬁcantly greater eﬀect on the adjustment of corporate
investment during tight monetary policies. Leverage has a greater eﬀect on ﬁnancing capacity in loose mone-
tary policy periods than in tight periods. Monetary authorities should pay more attention to ﬁrms with high
leverage during loose monetary policy periods.Acknowledgements
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